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MOOTING THE NIGHT AWAY:
POSTINAUGURATION MIDNIGHT-RULE
CHANGES AND VACATUR FOR MOOTNESS
ARI CUENIN†
ABSTRACT
When a case decided by a lower court becomes moot pending
appeal, the appellate court must decide whether to vacate that
decision. This scenario may arise in litigation spurred by opposition
to an outgoing presidential administration’s midnight regulations—
rules hurriedly promulgated during the president’s last days in office.
An incoming president may change an unfinished midnight rule
pending appeal of a decision invalidating that rule, thereby mooting
the case. Faced with this posture in a case against the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Tenth Circuit vacated as
moot the lower court’s decision invalidating a Forest Service rule,
despite unclear vacatur-for-mootness case law that questions whether
vacatur is appropriate when a rule change causes mootness.
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach was correct and
should be followed in midnight-regulation cases. Although this Note
does not argue that rule changes per se warrant vacatur, midnightregulation research shows that the motives surrounding the practice
are not related to litigation, but rather to political differences between
incoming and outgoing administrations. Moreover, the Supreme
Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. hints that
courts should not scrutinize government motives for rule changes and
that political reasons are appropriate justifications for changing rules.
Because motive is critical to vacatur analysis, cases involving
midappeal midnight-rule-change mootness should be vacated.
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INTRODUCTION
Presidential administrations often speedily promulgate several
last rules before a new president—particularly one from a different
political party—takes office. Administrative-law scholars and the
1
media have termed this practice midnight regulation. Midnightregulation scholarship posits that the motives surrounding the
2
practice are largely political, and recent incoming presidents have
confronted the practice by suspending unfinished midnight rules upon
3
taking office for similar political reasons. Controversial midnight
regulations may also irk private parties, who often sue the outgoing
administration in federal court over the validity of its midnight rules,
4
even before the new president takes office. When the president
finally does take office, the new administration becomes the
defendant in these lawsuits, though often in name only. That is, the
incoming administration may find itself in court defending rules that
5
it wants to change.
Adding insult to injury, an incoming administration might face a
6
separate legal challenge if it decides to change the rule and undo its
7
predecessor’s midnight rulemaking. Longstanding Supreme Court

1. See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations & Regulatory Review,
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2009) (“[M]idnight regulation[] describes the dramatic spike of
new regulations promulgated at the end of presidential terms, especially during transitions to an
administration of the opposite party.”); John M. Broder, A Legacy Bush Can Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (“Every president comes into office
complaining about the . . . midnight regulations left on the White House doorstep by his
predecessor.”); see also infra Part III.
2. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, Between a Hard
Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 588
(2003) (“Midnight regulations are an important political weapon.”); see also Broder, supra note
1 (describing midnight regulation as “a way for an administration to have life after death”
(quoting Philip Clapp, President, National Environmental Trust)); infra Part III.A.
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. See infra Part III.C.
5. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 624 (2003) (“After the State of Idaho
had filed litigation challenging [a Clinton-era midnight] rule . . . the Bush administration
indicated that it would not be defending the rule on the merits.” (footnotes omitted)).
6. Changing or rescinding midnight rules posttransition is frequently described as
“undoing” midnight regulations. See, e.g., REECE RUSHING, RICK MELBERTH & MATT MADIA,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & OMB WATCH, AFTER MIDNIGHT: THE BUSH LEGACY OF
DEREGULATION AND WHAT OBAMA CAN DO 6 (2009), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2009/01/pdf/midnight_regulations.pdf (listing “[o]ptions for blocking and
undoing midnight regulations”).
7. See infra Part III.C.
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administrative law doctrine made posttransition rule changes difficult
8
to defend if challenged in court, and at least one president avoided
changing his predecessor’s midnight rules for fear that he could not
9
justify the modifications to a court’s satisfaction. In a recent decision,
however, the Supreme Court relaxed scrutiny of the reasons that may
10
legitimately support an agency’s decision to change policy. This
decision supports postinauguration rule changes; incoming
administrations will more readily change unfinished midnight rules
upon taking office without fear of stiff judicial scrutiny of their
11
motives.
This development leaves an open question: procedurally, what
should happen if a plaintiff successfully challenges a midnight rule in
a district court but, pending appeal, a new administration changes the
12
disputed rule, thus mooting the case? In Wyoming v. USDA
13
(Wyoming II), a rare court of appeals decision presenting this
14
15
situation, the Tenth Circuit vacated as moot the district court’s
8. See infra Part III.C.2.
9. See Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, Empirical Study, After Midnight: The Durability
of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1441 (2005) (noting President George W. Bush’s “reluctance to amend or
repeal midnight regulations” because of rule-change doctrine).
10. The case, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), and the Court’s
position on agency policy change are discussed in Part III.C.2, infra.
11. For further discussion of incoming presidents’ responses to unfinished midnight rules,
see infra Part III.B, and for further discussion of judicial review of these responses, see infra
Part III.C.
12. Cf. 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10 (3d ed. 2008) (“Distinctive questions arise
when a case becomes moot after decision by the trial court. . . . The proper course to follow
after determining that the case is moot and must not be decided on the merits, however,
is . . . complicated.”).
13. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
14. Although other courts have analyzed vacatur in cases involving mootness from rule
changes, e.g., Tafas v. Kappos 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), and policy changes, e.g.,
19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 1996), Wyoming II
is one of (if not the) only court of appeals cases that addressed a change to a midnight rule.
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rand, Recent Decision, The D.C. Circuit Review, August 1996–July
1997—Civil Procedure: Diluting the Presumption Against Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789,
790–91 (1998) (“Once a court determines that a judgment is moot, it may not consider its merits,
but may dispose of the case as justice may require. A court examines the nature and character of
the conditions which have caused the case to become moot in deciding whether to vacate the
lower court’s decision.” (footnotes and internal quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court has
noted that vacatur is an “extraordinary remedy.” U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall
P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994).
An appellate court may either vacate as moot directly or remand to the district court
with instructions to consider whether vacatur is appropriate. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 29. This
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ruling striking down a U.S. Forest Service regulation banning forest
16
road construction (Wyoming I). It is unclear that such a course is
proper: the Supreme Court has never confronted the problem, there
exists little other precedent for the scenario, several courts of appeals
have indicated that they might have decided the issue differently, and
the Federal Circuit actually did so in another case involving mootness
17
caused by a rule change. This Note, however, argues that the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis was correct and should be applied in similar cases.
Vacatur is the appropriate remedy for midnight-rulemaking cases
mooted when an incoming administration changes a challenged
regulation pending appeal.
Part I of this Note introduces the Tenth Circuit’s decision to
vacate as moot the lower court’s decision on a midnight rule’s
validity. Part II discusses vacatur-for-mootness doctrine, including the
debate over the vacatur remedy, Supreme Court precedent, and
vacatur analysis in the lower courts. Part III introduces midnight
rulemaking, laying out the controversy surrounding the practice,
motives for regulating at midnight, and reasons that an incoming
president would want to change his predecessor’s unfinished midnight
rules. Part III also explains the main tools used to respond to
midnight rules—postinauguration rule suspensions and litigation—
and discusses the standards courts apply when reviewing the undoing
of midnight rules in such litigation. In particular, it discusses these
standards in light of the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox
18
Television Stations, Inc. Finally, Part IV examines the Tenth
Circuit’s vacatur analysis in light of the ambiguous case law on the
subject and the midnight-rulemaking observations made in Part III.
This Note concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s approach was correct,
that it should be followed in similar cases, and that it might guide how
scholars and courts view midnight rulemaking and rule-change
mootness.
I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND THE ROADLESS RULE
The ongoing battle over the U.S. Forest Service’s 2001 “roadless
rule,” which prohibited road development in large swaths of National
Note uses these options interchangeably.
16. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1214, vacating as moot 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003);
see also infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
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19

Forest land, exemplifies judicial involvement with midnight
rulemaking. Promulgated during the Clinton administration’s last
days, the regulation spurred controversy that has spanned several
presidential administrations and lingered in courts for nearly a
20
decade.
Almost immediately, courts questioned the rule’s
controversial promulgation. Indeed, the district court judge in
21
Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I) noted that “the United States
Forest Service drove through the administrative process in a vehicle
22
smelling of political prestidigitation.” The roadless-rule litigation is
particularly important because the Bush administration rescinded the
roadless rule while the Wyoming I decision invalidating it was on
23
appeal, thereby mooting the case. This Part explains the roadless
rule’s controversial promulgation, discusses the effect of President
Bush’s postinauguration rule change on the litigation, and introduces
the Tenth Circuit’s vacatur decision in Wyoming II.
A. Roadless Rule Background
24

Although branded as a midnight regulation, the roadless rule’s
25
history predates President Clinton’s waning term in office. When
Congress created the Forest Service in 1897, it gave forest

19. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3272–73 (Jan. 12, 2001)
(codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294 (2009)); see also Mendelson, supra note 5, at 619–20
(explaining the roadless rule’s novelty and interest). See generally Martin Nie, Administrative
Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 687, 696–714 (2004) (providing a history of the roadless rule).
20. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40777, “MIDNIGHT RULES”
ISSUED NEAR THE END OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: A STATUS REPORT 27 (2009).
21. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I), 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated as
moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
22. Id. at 1203.
23. See Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Oral
argument was held on May 4, 2005, and the next day the Forest Service announced the adoption
of a final rule replacing the Roadless Rule. . . . [T]he new [State Petitions for Inventoried
Roadless Area Management] rule moots this case . . . .”); see also Anne Joseph O’Connell,
Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94
VA. L. REV. 889, 905 n.50 (2008) (“The [Tenth Circuit] case was mooted when the USDA,
under President Bush, rescinded the [roadless] rule.”).
24. E.g., Susan E. Dudley, The Bush Administration Regulatory Record, REGULATION,
Winter 2004–2005, at 4, 5, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n4/v27n4mercreport.pdf (calling the roadless rule a “prominent Clinton midnight regulation”); Ben
Lieberman, Opinion, Midnight Madness—Washington Style, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 10,
2001, at B7 (listing the roadless rule among midnight regulations).
25. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 619–27 (providing a history of the roadless rule); Nie,
supra note 19, at 696–714 (same).
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administrators the power to protect public forests from
26
environmental damage. In 1924, the Forest Service created the first
of several “wilderness preserves”—“primitive” areas undisturbed by
27
roads and similar improvements. Congress later codified this
process, directing the Forest Service to analyze federal lands that
28
could qualify as roadless wilderness areas under the Wilderness Act.
Between 1977 and 1979, the Forest Service flagged approximately 62
29
million National Forest acres as potential roadless wilderness.
Although the Forest Service abandoned its land-analysis
programs after unfavorable court rulings, the Clinton administration
30
resurrected Forest Service wilderness area identification. In 1999 the
Forest Service suspended road construction activities in inventoried
31
roadless areas while it developed a new road management policy.
An “Interim Roadless Rule” took effect on March 1, 1999, imposing
an eighteen-month road-construction moratorium in inventoried
32
roadless areas. In October 1999, President Clinton directed the
33
Forest Service to issue a final rule no later than the fall of 2000. This
directive’s timing was problematic:
The Forest Service recognized that if it were to issue the final rule
by December 2000, it would have to require a very short
timeframe . . . for the public to respond to [the Notice of Intent]. As
a result, the Roadless Rule [Notice of Intent] provided for a sixty34
day comment period, which expired on December 20, 1999.

26. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–478,
479–482, 551 (2006)) (“The Secretary of the Interior shall make provisions for the protection
against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and forest
reservations . . . .”).
27. H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENV.
U. L. REV. 413, 434 (1999).
28. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006)); id. § 3(b), 78 Stat. at 891 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1132); see also Nie, supra note 19, at 698 (“The Wilderness Act included a congressional
mandate that the FS [Forest Service] inventory its land for possible wilderness designation.”).
29. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I), 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated
as moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System:
Temporary Suspension of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed.
Reg. 7290, 7304–05 (Feb. 12, 1999) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 212.13 (2000))).
33. Id. at 1206.
34. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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After the Notice of Intent comment period expired, the Forest
Service proceeded on an expedited timeframe despite calls from
35
several states to extend it. Although commenters decried the Forest
Service’s subsequent Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
comment procedure as a “sham” and “simply going through
the . . . motions to reach a predetermined outcome,” the Forest
Service refused to extend the EIS comment period, which closed in
36
July 2000. The final roadless rule was published on January 12, 2001,
37
and prohibited road construction in inventoried roadless areas. As
one court later noted, “this vast national forest acreage, for better or
worse, was more committed to pristine wilderness, and less amenable
38
to road development.”
Almost immediately after the roadless rule was finalized in
39
January 2001, Wyoming challenged it in a Wyoming district court,
40
alleging numerous procedural violations in the rule’s promulgation.
The district court agreed and issued a permanent injunction against
41
its enforcement. Although the government acquiesced in the
decision, the defendant environmental groups that intervened in
42
support of the rule appealed.
But the Tenth Circuit never reviewed the appeal’s merits. Just
after taking office in 2001, President Bush suspended all rules that
43
had not yet taken effect, including the roadless rule. Citing
35. Id. at 1207.
36. Id. at 1209.
37. Id. at 1210.
38. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman (Kootenai Tribe II), 313 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir.
2002).
39. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005); see also
Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (describing the Wyoming suit); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v.
Veneman (Kootenai Tribe I), No. CV01-10-N-EJL, 2001 WL 1141275, at *1 (D. Idaho May 10,
2001), rev’d, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing a similar challenge to the rule in the
District of Idaho).
40. Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1203–04.
41. Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
42. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1210. Interestingly, “[a] number of environmental
organizations intervened on behalf of the federal defendants in defense of the Rule.” Id.; see
also Nie, supra note 19, at 706 (“[T]he new administration chose not to defend the rule in
court . . . . [But] the Ninth Circuit granted intervenor status to several environmental groups.”).
43. Kootenai Tribe II, 313 F.3d at 1106 (“On January 20, 2001, newly-inaugurated
President George Walker Bush issued an order postponing by sixty days the effective date of all
the prior administration’s regulations and rules not yet implemented. The effective date of the
Roadless Rule was thus postponed until May 12, 2001.”); see also Memorandum for the Heads
and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24,
2001) (directing executive departments and agencies to temporarily postpone the effective dates
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“concerns about the process through which the Rule was
promulgated, the Forest Service [told the district court that it]
planned to initiate an additional public process that
44
[would] . . . examine possible modifications to the Rule.” In 2005,
the reappraisal process ultimately yielded “a final rule replacing the
45
Roadless Rule.” The Tenth Circuit held that this new rule mooted
the dispute over the original roadless rule, and the court vacated as
46
moot the district court’s ruling in favor of Wyoming.
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision to Vacate as Moot
Before deciding whether to vacate the district court’s decision,
the Wyoming II court analyzed whether the dispute was actually
moot. The court noted that its power under Article III of the
Constitution to hear the appeal turned on whether there was an
47
“actual, ongoing case[] or controvers[y]” in the dispute. The court
could not hear the case “if the issues presented [were] no longer
48
live.” Because the Bush administration had replaced the roadless
rule pending the appeal, the court held that the new rule
“eliminat[ed] the issues” in the case and “rendered the appeal
49
moot.” Not only did the challenged portions of the roadless rule “no
longer exist” under the new rule, but the roadless rule’s “alleged
procedural deficiencies” were also “irrelevant because the
replacement rule was promulgated in a new and separate rulemaking
50
process.”
The appellants argued that the case was not moot because the
roadless rule could later be reinstated or, alternatively, that the Forest

of published regulations not yet implemented); William M. Jack, Comment, Taking Care that
Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory Process Is Faithfully Executed: A Review of Rule
Withdrawals and Rule Suspensions Under the Bush Administration’s Card Memorandum, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2002) (“On January 20, 2001, Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the
President and Chief of Staff, issued a memorandum . . . temporarily postpon[ing] the effective
dates of published regulations not yet in effect.”).
44. Kootenai Tribe II, 313 F.3d at 1106 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
45. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).
48. Id. (quoting City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. Id. at 1212.
50. Id.
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Service had “strategically manipulated the courts.” The court,
however, rejected these contentions, in part because the roadless
52
rule’s opponents could bring another suit if it were reinstated.
Contrary to the appellants’ suggestion, the court also observed that
the government changed its rule not because of the district court’s
judgment, but because the government believed that the roadless rule
53
merited revision. Holding that the appeal was moot, the court turned
54
to whether the district court’s judgment should be vacated.
55
In its vacatur analysis, the court focused on the reason for the
mootness. The court observed that vacatur for mootness is
appropriate “when mootness results from happenstance or the actions
56
of the prevailing party.” The reason for this “general practice” of
vacatur, the court noted, is that the appellant would otherwise
57
unfairly lose his right to appeal an adverse judgment. Vacatur,
however, “is generally not appropriate when mootness is a result of a
58
voluntary act of a nonprevailing party.”
As an equitable remedy, the court observed that “[v]acatur . . . is
59
determined by the particular circumstances of each case.” The court
first noted that the USDA had not appealed the ruling against the
60
roadless rule: “[B]ecause the party seeking appellate relief is not the
party responsible for mooting the case, the orderly operation of the
61
appellate system is not being frustrated.” That is, none of the facts
indicated that the USDA had repealed the regulation to manipulate
62
or “undermine the district court’s ruling.” As the court observed,
“the replacement of the Roadless Rule was not triggered by the

51. Id.
52. Id. (“If the Roadless Rule were to reappear in the future, there would be ample
opportunity to challenge the rule before it ceased to exist.”).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1212–13.
55. For a discussion of the vacatur-for-mootness doctrine and the inquiry courts make in
deciding whether to vacate, see infra Part II.
56. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1213 n.6.
60. Id. at 1213; see also Aaron S. Bayer, Vacatur for Mootness, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at
15 (“The court reasoned that since the Forest Service was not appealing the adverse decision
(intervening environmental groups had filed the appeal), there was no manipulation of the
judicial process and vacatur was appropriate.”).
61. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213.
62. Id. at 1213 n.6.
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district court’s judgment, but merely reflects the government’s
63
discontent with the rule itself.” The court analogized the
circumstances of mootness in the roadless rule litigation to mootness
64
caused by a legislature repealing a disputed statute. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment.
The Wyoming II court recognized the controversy of its holding,
though. Although the court ultimately determined the roadless rule
case was “more akin to one in which a controversy is mooted through
65
‘circumstances unattributable to any of the parties,’” the roadless
rule’s rescission was directly attributable to a litigant’s action—the
66
Forest Service’s promulgation of a new rule. Moreover, although the
court compared the rule’s rescission by an agency to a statute’s repeal
by a legislature, this analogy was ultimately based on analyzing the
agency’s motives for the rescission in this particular case rather than
67
on evaluating agency rule changes generally. In a footnote, the
Wyoming II court noted that, in the very case to which it had
analogized, the D.C. Circuit had indicated that it may not have
68
vacated if the mootness had been caused by agency action.
Nevertheless, because the Forest Service had not attempted to “avoid
or undermine the district court’s ruling,” the Wyoming II court
determined that “[a]ny unfairness that may generally result from
vacating a lower court’s judgment when the losing party moots a case
69
[was] not present.”
Although the roadless-rule litigation exemplifies only one option
for when a postinauguration midnight-rule change moots a case
70
midappeal, the rarity of such cases makes it an important example.
Because of its rarity, the Tenth Circuit’s vacatur analysis could guide
future decisions in similar cases. But the Tenth Circuit’s approach
should be avoided if that court reached the wrong conclusion—a valid

63. Id. at 1212.
64. Id. at 1213 (comparing the roadless rule’s replacement to the mootness caused by
legislative enactment in National Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)).
65. Id. (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994)).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 49–54.
67. See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 (“This is . . . not a case in which a litigant is
attempting to manipulate the courts . . . .”).
68. Id. at 1213 n.6 (citing Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 353).
69. Id.
70. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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71

concern in light of unsettled case law on the subject. Though this
Note ultimately concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s analysis was
72
correct, the following Part explores the broader doctrinal
controversy surrounding vacatur for mootness.
II. VACATUR-FOR-MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND MIDAPPEAL
RULE CHANGES
In Wyoming II, the Tenth Circuit decided in favor of vacatur, but
73
it acknowledged the legal uncertainty on the issue. This Part
examines the legal background of vacatur-for-mootness doctrine,
discussing the controversy behind a court’s decision to vacate, current
Supreme Court case law, and vacatur analyses in the lower courts
when law change has caused mootness.
A. An Introduction to Vacatur as a Remedy for Mootness
Determining whether to vacate a lower court decision for
mootness starts from the fairly uncontroversial position that Article
III of the Constitution requires an actual “case or controversy”
through each litigation phase. Although a controversy may have
existed when a district court issued an opinion, a change of
circumstances may have resolved it. At that point, a case is moot, and
74
an appellate court must dismiss the appeal. But if it does, it must
then decide what to do with the lower court opinion. Essentially, the
opinion can either remain good law or be vacated.
This question bears significant consequences. If the appellate
75
court vacates the decision, the decision will lose legal force and
76
precedential value. This decision can affect the prevailing litigant in
71. See infra Part II.B–C.
72. See infra Part IV.
73. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 & n.6.
74. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990) (“[Article III’s] caseor-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate. To sustain our jurisdiction in the present case, it is not enough that a dispute was
very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals.”);
see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Cases . . . [and]
Controversies . . . .”).
75. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 606–32 (1991)
(detailing the effect of vacatur on judgments).
76. See id. at 630 (“Although a vacated decision may remain in the case reporters, its
precedential value is extremely limited.” (footnote omitted)). For more information on court
rules against the citation of vacated, depublished, and unpublished opinions, see generally
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the action below in other ways. For example, if the lower court’s
opinion is vacated, the litigant will be unable to recover legal fees to
77
which he is entitled by statute as the prevailing party —a party
cannot prevail in a judgment that no longer exists.
Loss of a vacated judgment’s precedential effect can also have
repercussions beyond those involved in the initial litigation. When a
lower court has decided an issue in one case, the nonmutual collateral
estoppel doctrine gives that decision preclusive effect if another
78
litigant sues on the same issue. In other words, the court hearing the
new litigation would dismiss the issue as having already been
79
adjudicated. If the lower court’s judgment is vacated by an appellate
court, however, future litigants lose the ability to assert nonmutual
80
collateral estoppel, and the next court must decide the issue again.
This scenario affects mostly private parties, though, because litigants
typically cannot assert nonmutual collateral estoppel against the
81
government.
Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003).
77. Certain statutes, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, abrogate the common law and allow prevailing
parties to recover attorneys’ fees from party opponents:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (alterations in original). Vacatur for mootness pending appeal strips
parties of prevailing party status for § 1988 purposes. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480; see also Appellee
Triantafyllos Tafas’ Reply to Motion for Dismissal of Appeal & Request for Remand at 5–6,
Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (No. 2008-1352) (“[E]ntitlement
to . . . fees is dependent upon a threshold showing that Tafas is a prevailing party. Tafas should
not be precluded by vacatur from recovering his attorneys fees despite prevailing at the district
court . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006))).
78. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1311–
12 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining nonmutual collateral estoppel).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment . . . the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.”).
80. See, e.g., Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1395 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“Vacating the consent judgment would preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a later case
and decide the issue before it arises.”).
81. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (denying preclusion under
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government in a criminal prosecution). A party who
prevailed against the government may still oppose vacatur for other reasons, such as the desire
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Precedential value and issue preclusion are public values of
82
judgments. Vacating judgments thus bears a public cost. Indeed,
scholars often cite the loss of public value as a reason that courts
83
should not vacate opinions. Thus, when deciding to vacate a
judgment, courts must weigh the equities of preserving the judgment’s
84
public value against the reasons supporting vacatur.
Because vacatur carries such serious consequences, courts
scrutinize the underlying reason for mootness, particularly when a
party’s action has rendered the decision moot. The main concern is
that a litigant, faced with unfavorable precedent in a lower court’s
opinion, will attempt to moot the case on appeal to eliminate the
85
judgment’s effect. The issue is particularly critical for parties who
know they will routinely litigate the same issue in other courts in the
86
future. On the other hand, involuntarily forfeiting one’s right to
appeal, due to uncontrollable circumstances, would be inherently
inequitable. This consideration tips the balance toward vacatur under
87
such circumstances—it would be inequitable not to vacate. Thus,
to recover fees as the prevailing party. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
That nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply against the government ties in to the
concept of agency nonacquiescence—an agency’s refusal to follow precedent against it. See
generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (discussing agency nonacquiescence). For present purposes,
agencies may have even less incentive to avoid negative precedent by manipulatively changing
rules to prompt vacatur because agencies can simply nonacquiesce in the judgments against
them. See infra text accompanying notes 256–59.
82. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 75, at 641 (listing “forgoing the collateral estoppel and res
judicata effects of the prior judgment,” “the erasure of collateral consequences of an adverse
judgment, the loss of precedential value for judicial decisions, and a diminished respect for the
judicial process” among the “social costs” of vacatur); see also Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1526–32 (1994) (surveying some of the oft-cited
public values of judgments).
83. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 75, at 641–42 (arguing against vacatur in cases in which
settlement moots the dispute because of the public cost of vacatur).
84. See, e.g., Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. W. Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir.
1982) (explaining that the decision to vacate “may be different in different cases as equities and
hardships vary the balance between the competing values of right to relitigate and finality of
judgment”).
85. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 193 (identifying the concern that vacatur for
mootness could “let[] repeat players ‘buy up’ judgments that they dislike by settling cases
pending on appeal and seeking vacatur”).
86. Id.; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 325, 335 (1994) (“[V]acatur seems like a type of precedential hide and
seek . . . . Allowing routine vacatur also seems inconsistent with the broader structure of
adjudicative lawmaking.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1994) (stating
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although vacatur is described as an “extraordinary” remedy to be
89
granted only when the “balance of the equities” favors vacatur, the
parties’ motives and the reasons for mootness guide which weights a
court selects for its scale.
B. Supreme Court Case Law on Vacatur for Mootness
The Supreme Court’s vacatur-for-mootness jurisprudence is
90
largely confined to two cases: United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. and
91
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership. These cases’
central principle is that “[w]hen a case in a federal system becomes
moot on appeal, the disposition depends on the nature of the events
92
that mooted the dispute.”
The dispute in Munsingwear involved a regulatory price-fixing
claim against Munsingwear. The United States unsuccessfully
prosecuted the claim in district court and appealed the case. With the
appeal pending, however, the commodity whose price Munsingwear
93
had allegedly manipulated was deregulated. Although the United
States was a litigant, the Court considered the deregulation
“happenstance” and suggested, in dicta, that vacatur was necessary to
“clear[] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the
94
parties.” Today, Munsingwear’s holding is considered to mean that
[v]acatur is generally appropriate when a case becomes moot
because of “happenstance” or developments unrelated to the
litigation, or when the appellee’s actions moot the case, on the
theory that the winner below should not be able to manipulate the
95
judicial process to insulate its victory from appellate review.

Although the case did not address whether regulatory activity that
causes mootness—such as deregulation—is generally an appropriate
that “[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the
vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment” under
the “equitable tradition of vacatur”).
88. Id. at 26.
89. E.g., Hyundai Merch. Marine Co. Ltd. v. Oceanic Petrol. Source PTE, 656 F. Supp. 2d
416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he Court finds that the balance of the equities weighs against
vacatur.”); accord Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26.
90. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
91. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
92. FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 192.
93. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 37.
94. Id. at 39–40.
95. Bayer, supra note 60.
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reason for vacatur, Munsingwear remains the leading case on federal
96
vacatur in civil cases that have become moot on appeal.
Unlike Munsingwear, the Supreme Court’s 1994 Bonner Mall
decision addressed vacatur when the parties intended to moot the
case through settlement. The litigants in Bonner Mall settled the case,
thereby mooting it, and requested vacatur as part of the settlement
97
terms. Because “[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an
adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought
not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment,” the Bonner
Mall Court approved of Munsingwear’s “happenstance” dictum in
98
favor of vacatur. On the other hand, “[w]here mootness results from
settlement . . . the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal
remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby
99
surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.” Bonner
Mall instructs that the primary consideration in a vacatur decision “is
whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the
100
mootness by voluntary action.” If so, then the judgment below
should not be vacated unless the matter presents “extraordinary
101
circumstances” that tip the equitable balance in favor of vacatur.
That is, the losing party is generally not entitled to vacatur if
requested as a settlement condition.
Although it approved of Munsingwear’s holding, the Bonner
Mall Court questioned, without deciding, whether the Munsingwear
Court adhered to its own reasoning:
The suit for injunctive relief in Munsingwear became moot on
appeal because the regulations sought to be enforced by the United
States were annulled by Executive Order. We express no view on
Munsingwear’s implicit conclusion that repeal of administrative
regulations cannot fairly be attributed to the Executive Branch
102
when it litigates in the name of the United States.

Thus, one reading of Munsingwear suggests that vacatur is
appropriate when a case is mooted because the underlying regulation

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 192.
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20 (1994).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 25 n.3 (citation omitted).
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103

in dispute was repealed. As Bonner Mall points out, Munsingwear
implies that the repeal of a regulation may be “happenstance”—
within the permissible bounds of vacatur—even when the government
104
is a litigant. But Bonner Mall could be read as disapproving vacatur
in Munsingwear-like scenarios, suggesting that repealing a regulation
105
could count as a voluntary action that would preclude vacatur.
Ultimately, whether a rule rescission or change is a “vagary of
circumstance”—vacatur proper—or the voluntary action of a
litigant—vacatur improper—is a question not yet definitively
answered by the Supreme Court.
C. Vacatur for Mootness, Law Changes, and the Lower Courts
The lower court decisions offered in this Section address vacatur
when a law change moots the underlying dispute. These decisions
necessarily encompass more than just changes to an outgoing
administration’s midnight rules, in part because appellate cases
106
concerning midnight rules are uncommon. In this latter category,
Wyoming II stands out as a rare example. There, the Tenth Circuit
vacated the lower court’s ruling on the roadless rule because no facts
indicated that the USDA had repealed the regulation to manipulate
107
the district court’s ruling. Although the cases in this Section address
changes that differ from the one at issue in Wyoming II, this Section
shows that the same concerns underlie all vacatur-for-mootness
analyses involving law changes.
108
In Valero Terrestrial Co. v. Paige, the Fourth Circuit held that
vacatur was proper when the mootness resulted from the West
Virginia legislature’s amendment of a statutory provision and when
109
the equities weighed in favor of vacatur. The Fourth Circuit noted
that the defendants, who included state executives but not the

103. See, e.g., Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (“This
is not a case in which a litigant is attempting to manipulate the courts to obtain the relief it was
not able to win in the judicial system.”).
104. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 25 n.3.
105. See Bayer, supra note 60 (“[W]here the government agency in the case moots the
appeal by withdrawing its own contested policy or regulation, that action ordinarily will
preclude vacatur.” (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. U.S. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 698–99 (10th Cir. 2000); 19
Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142, 1145 (10th Cir. 1996))).
106. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
107. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 n.6.
108. Valero Terrestrial Co. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2000).
109. Id. at 123.
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governor, were not responsible for the legislative action that mooted
110
the case. “Therefore, defendant state executive officials are in a
position akin to a party who finds its case mooted by happenstance,
rather than events within its control. . . . As a result, the principal
111
consideration under [Bonner Mall] counsels in favor of vacatur.”
In dictum, however, the Fourth Circuit explicitly acknowledged
that mootness by regulation repeal may render vacatur improper and
limited its holding accordingly:
Because none of the changes in state law responsible for the
mootness of this controversy were changes in administrative or
executive regulations, we need not address ourselves to the question
reserved by the Court in Bancorp of whether the “repeal of
administrative regulations” can “fairly be attributed to the
Executive Branch when it litigates in the name of the United
112
States.”

The Third and D.C. Circuits have also held that Bonner Mall’s
antivacatur presumption for voluntary actions does not apply when
113
legislative action moots a government party’s appeal. Aside from
the presumed legitimacy of legislative actions, the underlying
reasoning is that “[t]he legislature may act out of reasons totally
independent of the pending lawsuit, or because the lawsuit has
114
convinced it that the existing law is flawed.”
Whether this deferential posture extends to administrative
actions is unclear. For instance, the D.C. Circuit in National Black
115
Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia implied that it may not have
vacated had the action been rendered moot by an administrative,

110. Id. at 121.
111. Id.; see also NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 488 F.3d 1065, 1069–70
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because the disputed regulations had been struck down by the
courts, and not repealed by any party to the litigation, the judicial resolution of the controversy
qualified as happenstance and vacatur was permissible).
112. Valero, 211 F.3d at 121 n.4 (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,
513 U.S. 18, 25 n.3 (1994)).
113. Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194–95 (3d Cir.
2001); Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 351–52 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
see also Rand, supra note 15, at 791 (“The [Bonner Mall] Court established a general
presumption against vacatur that could only be overcome by ‘extraordinary circumstances’ . . . .”
(quoting Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 29)).
114. Khodara, 237 F.3d at 195; see also Chem. Producers & Distribs. Ass’n v. Helliker, 463
F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Lobbying Congress or a state legislature cannot be viewed as
‘causing’ subsequent legislation for purposes of the vacatur inquiry.”).
115. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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rather than a legislative, action. In Cammermeyer v. Perry, the
Ninth Circuit denied vacatur when the government reworked the
offending regulation and reinstated Cammermeyer’s military
commission during the course of the appeal, thus rendering the action
118
moot. Following Bonner Mall, the court determined that the Army’s
voluntary actions weighed against vacatur because “it was defendants
who rendered this case moot by conceding that Cammermeyer should
119
be reinstated and by replacing the challenged regulation.”
Perhaps the strongest argument against rule-change vacatur for
mootness came from the Federal Circuit in 2009. In Tafas v.
120
Kappos, the court denied vacatur of the district court’s judgment
because the rescission of a U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
121
(USPTO) rule mooted the dispute between the litigants. Citing
Bonner Mall’s antivacatur language for cases mooted by the losing
party’s actions, the court held that vacatur was “inappropriate under
122
the circumstances.” By rescinding its rule pending appeal, the
123
USPTO “acted unilaterally to render the case moot.” Although the
USPTO and the other parties joining in its vacatur motion argued
that vacatur was appropriate because mootness caused by a rule
change was like mootness caused by legislative action—a scenario
typically considered beyond the parties’ control and favoring
124
vacatur —the court found the analogy inapposite:
This is not a case in which the regulations have been overridden by a
statutory change; instead, it is a case in which the agency itself has
voluntarily withdrawn the regulations and thus set the stage for a

116. See id. at 353 (“[T]he Bancorp presumption against vacatur might apply if the case has
been rendered moot on appeal by enactment or repeal of a regulation, even though the courts
accord the executive branch the same presumption of legitimate motive as is given the
legislative branch.”).
117. Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
118. Id. at 1239. In this case, the district court ruled that both Cammermeyer’s discharge
from the military on the grounds of her sexual orientation and the Army’s homosexuality
regulations were unconstitutional. Id. at 1237. Before the Ninth Circuit heard Cammermeyer’s
appeal, she was reinstated and the Army implemented its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Id.
119. Id. at 1239.
120. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
121. Id. at 1371.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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declaration of mootness. . . . The agency does not control Congress;
125
but it does control the decision to rescind the regulations.

As the losing party in the district court below, the USPTO had
“procure[d] the conditions” through its rule change. The court thus
126
refused the USPTO’s request to vacate the adverse judgment.
In sum, even when government entities are litigants, appellate
courts have generally held that a legislative act or a judicial decision
that occurs pending appeal and renders the appeal moot does not
127
constitute voluntary action that weighs against vacatur. But when a
government party changes or revokes a regulation midappeal, thus
rendering the case moot, vacatur turns on whether the regulator
appears to have been trying to manipulate the appellate process. For
example, the Tenth Circuit in Wyoming II readily vacated the district
court’s decision because the USDA lost below but changed its
128
regulation to render the case moot. On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit in Cammermeyer refused to vacate the district court’s ruling
that the Army’s sexual-orientation regulations were unconstitutional
when the Army enacted its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy during the
129
appeal. The Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion when the
130
USPTO mooted a case by changing its rule. These cases suggest that
the nature of the regulation’s revocation is an important factor in a
court’s decision to vacate as moot, but that the courts of appeals have
not settled on which motives for changing rules are legitimate and
thus support vacatur. The remainder of this Note examines where
mootness caused by postelection changes to unfinished midnight rules
fits within this analysis.
III. MIDNIGHT REGULATION: MOTIVES AND RESPONSES
As Part II demonstrated, determining a party’s motive for
mooting a dispute is central to the vacatur analysis. This Part
examines a new administration’s possible motives for mooting

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part I.B; see also Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 355 F.3d 1215, 1220
(10th Cir. 2004) (“When the government undertakes remedial measures that do not result in
manipulation of the judicial process and eliminate the underlying cause of an injunction, vacatur
will be granted.”).
129. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 120–26.

CUENIN IN PRINTER PROOF

472

10/17/2010 10:28:22 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:453

litigation over an outgoing administration’s unfinished midnight rules.
The discussion explains that postinauguration changes to midnight
rules are largely responses to an outgoing administration’s last acts in
office. This part also surveys executive-branch tactics for countering
midnight regulations and judicial review of posttransition rules
changes.
A. The Controversy and Motives Surrounding Midnight Regulation
The upswing in regulatory activity that takes place when a new
131
president is elected has been well documented. This activity has
132
garnered rapt media attention and has generated a wealth of
academic interest in the outgoing president’s power during the
133
transition period. Observers scrutinize primarily the legitimacy of
increased regulatory activity in the last days of an administration—
particularly when the incoming administration is of a different
134
political party.
131. See, e.g., William G. Howell & Kenneth R. Mayer, The Last One Hundred Days, 35
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 550 (2005) (demonstrating empirically that presidents exercise
their power up to the last moment); see also Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The
Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1262 (2006) (“The
certainty of the deadline [marking the end of the outgoing president’s term] and the lengthy
period between the election and the inauguration of the new president provide conditions for a
great deal of late-term activity by an outgoing administration.”); Howell & Mayer, supra, at 550
(“[P]residents squeeze the[] last moments in office for all they are worth, issuing all sorts of
rules and directives, many of which cannot be changed without exacting a significant political
price . . . . While legislative processes may lay dormant at the end of a presidential term, the
production of unilateral directives kicks into high gear.”).
132. See, e.g., Tim Dickinson, Bush’s Final F.U., ROLLING STONE, Dec. 25, 2008, at 57
(chronicling the Bush administration’s last-minute regulations); Elizabeth Kolbert, Comment,
Midnight Hour, NEW YORKER, Nov. 24, 2008, at 39, 39 (describing midnight regulation
generally and commenting on the Bush administration specifically); Cindy Skrzycki, Democrats
Eye Bush Midnight Regulations, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at E1 (discussing the Obama
administration’s potential response to Bush’s last-minute regulations).
133. See, e.g., Beermann & Marshall, supra note 131 (evaluating how the Constitution and
midnight regulation might interact); Howell & Mayer, supra note 131 (discussing how the
outgoing administration might tie the hands of its successor); O’Connell, supra note 23
(conducting an empirical analysis of regulatory action, focusing in part on political transitions).
134. See, e.g., Beermann & Marshall, supra note 131, at 1266–67 (“The output of the
outgoing administration, including presidential and agency action of various types, tends to
increase substantially, especially when the outgoing administration is of the Democratic Party
and the incoming President is a Republican.”); O’Connell, supra note 23, at 913 n.76 (collecting
much of the negative commentary on midnight rulemaking). The main charges leveled against
midnight rulemaking are that it undermines presidential and administrative accountability,
promotes inefficiency, and is just wrong in principle. See, e.g., Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at
173–77 (citing William S. Morrow, Jr., Midnight Regulations: Natural Order or Disorderly
Governance, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2001, at 3, 18). But see Jack M. Beermann,
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Though scholars have long studied and documented midnight
regulation, the presidential motive for the practice is an open
135
question. One possible reason for midnight regulations might be
“the natural human tendency to work to deadline, which has been
136
referred to in the literature as the ‘Cinderella constraint.’” As
Professor Jack Beermann points out, however, this explanation does
137
not fully account for the “unseeml[iness]” of midnight rulemaking.
Instead, evidence suggests that outgoing presidents regulate at
138
midnight for strategic reasons. Professor Beermann, for example,
attributes the practice to three additional causes, two of which are
political: “[h]urrying” to “project [a] substantive agenda as far into
the future as possible,” “[w]aiting” to regulate at a moment that
“avoid[s] political consequences that might have been costly earlier in
139
the term,” and being “delayed by some external force.” Or, these
140
rules could be the result of strategic political “timing.” Because of
these other reasons, midnight regulation has been described as “an
141
important political weapon.” For the most part, outgoing presidents
142
use midnight regulation to “burrow” policy before leaving office.

Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 948, 952 (2003) (arguing that even if
presidents have sinister motives behind midnight regulations, “[e]fforts to embarrass or
hamstring the incoming administration are all part of the political process,” and “the outgoing
administration should be free to advance its political agenda until the end of its term”).
135. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 352, 352 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/9/
LRColl2009n9Beermann.pdf (“While midnight regulation provokes an instinctively negative
reaction, it is not completely clear what is wrong with it.”).
136. Id. (quoting Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase
Significantly During Post-Election Quarters (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/The_Cinderella_Constraint(1).pdf).
137. Beermann, supra note 134, at 948.
138. See Beermann, supra note 135, at 352 (explaining the predominantly strategic uses of
midnight regulation); see also Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 172 (“[P]assing midnight
regulations is a winning strategy for an outgoing president who wishes to project his influence
into the future.”).
139. Beermann, supra note 134, at 956.
140. Beermann, supra note 135, at 352 (“Timing is a form of waiting, not based on potential
negative consequences, but rather . . . in order to help either one’s own reelection bid or the
election prospects of the incumbent party.”).
141. Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 588.
142. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 559–63. Granted, not all late-term regulations are issued
strategically or politically. See RUSHING ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (“Most administrations pump
out a stream of new regulations at the end of a president’s term. . . . But not all midnight
regulations are created equal.”). This issue raises a characterization problem as “the line
between permissible late-term action and undesirable ‘midnight regulation’ is unlikely to be
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Research suggests that midnight regulation is an effective political
strategy because an outgoing president can “tie a new President’s
143
hands” by regulating at midnight.
Conversely, the incoming president might want to undo his
predecessor’s midnight regulations. The incoming president’s motives
may be political, such as when a new president wants to rescind a rule
144
that contradicts his own platform or when the regulation offends the
145
new administration’s beliefs about the proper role of regulation.
The new president might also suspect the regulatory procedures that
the old administration used before leaving office were deficient and
thus might want to redo the rulemaking process to get wider input
146
and better information. Finally, the new president might decide that
147
the rule is bad policy.
For present purposes, however, a fine distinction between
politics and policy is unnecessary. Even assuming that a neutral
observer like a court could discern political motive from policy
motive, it could not do so without difficulty. For example, a new
president might offer a policy-based reason for changing a rule, even
if the true motive for doing so is that keeping the rule would cost him
politically among his supporters. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
indicated the difficulty of discerning political motive and has
accordingly set a low bar for determining whether justifications for
148
agency position changes are legitimate. Thus, for any given change
to an unfinished midnight rule, the motive could arguably be

particularly clear and is largely in the eye of the beholder.” Beermann & Marshall, supra note
131, at 1287.
143. Beermann, supra note 134, at 984.
144. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 599–602 (explaining the political consequences of
midnight regulations for incoming presidents and arguing that “from the President-elect’s
standpoint, late-term policy entrenchment by the outgoing President is undeniably costly”); see
also Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 553, 557–59 (describing the “politicization” surrounding
midnight rulemaking).
145. See, e.g., Loring & Roth, supra note 9, at 1457 (explaining that President George W.
Bush desired to rescind many Clinton midnight regulations because of President Bush’s “antiregulatory leaning,” but that the Bush administration did not do so because “deregulation
may . . . prove more difficult to justify”).
146. See Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 558 (explaining midnight rulemaking’s “significant
defects,” including “sloppiness”); cf. Jack, supra note 43, at 1482 (explaining that the Bush
administration argued that “withdrawals and delays were necessary given the ‘haphazard’ and
‘last-minute’ nature of regulations issued under the Clinton Administration”).
147. For a discussion of a classic example of this pattern, see infra notes 195–201, 205–07 and
accompanying text.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 216–17.
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attributed to politics or policy. Ultimately, just as outgoing presidents
likely have political motives for midnight regulation, incoming
presidents likely have political motives for wanting to undo these
rules.
Whether politically motivated midnight rulemaking is
problematic ties into larger legitimacy concerns. As Professor
Beermann phrased it, pinpointing the problem with midnight
rulemaking is difficult:
[T]here seems to be a general perception that something has gone
wrong when an outgoing administration takes important action
while the incoming administration is waiting to take over. Most lateterm action is subject to the obvious question of why, if the
regulation was deemed so important, the administration failed to act
149
during the previous three or seven and three-quarters years.

Fundamentally, whether one perceives midnight rulemaking as
problematic rests upon what one perceives as regulation’s proper role
150
in the administrative state. Under one model of the administrative
state, agencies are technocratic experts, constantly promulgating new
regulations in the search for the optimal balance of health, safety,
151
cost, and other factors. If this model embodies the proper role of
agencies, then midnight rulemaking seems deeply troubling because it
introduces politics and a risk of procedural deficiency into the
152
rulemaking calculus.
Midnight rulemaking seems similarly
problematic under another administrative paradigm that views
agencies as the direct agents of Congress, executing only legislative
153
intent through regulation.
Another model of the administrative state, however, views
154
agencies as democratically accountable agents of the president.

149. Beermann, supra note 135, at 353.
150. For deep background on the modern administrative state, see generally Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
151. This model is commonly known as the “expertise” model. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464 (2003) (noting that the “‘expertise’ model” posits that agencies “merely
execute technocratic judgments”); Stewart, supra note 150, at 1678 (discussing the expertise
model).
152. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of this “transmission belt” model, see Stewart, supra note 150, at 1675–
76.
154. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001)
(arguing that agencies are accountable to the president).
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Under this presidential-control model, midnight rulemaking is an
155
expected and legitimate extension of presidential power. But if
regulating at midnight is a legitimate part of presidential power, then
it follows logically that incoming presidents would come to office
seeking to undo the unfinished midnight regulations left by their
predecessors. Undoing midnight regulations becomes just as much a
part of presidential control as midnight regulation itself.
None of these models paints a complete picture of the
administrative state. Though the presidential-control model has
156
become the predominant theory and has even found support in the
157
Supreme Court’s Fox decision, it does not fully explain how
158
agencies operate. Even looking at agencies through the lens of
presidential-control theory does not solve the puzzle of whether
midnight rulemaking is proper, but merely shifts focus to the balance
of power between outgoing and incoming presidents in the issuance
159
and undoing of midnight regulations. Although this Note does not
address which model is proper, the unresolved debate between
proponents of the predominant regulatory models may help explain
why midnight rulemaking remains controversial.
B. Action in Response to Midnight Regulation
Although midnight rulemaking’s underlying propriety is
160
debatable, the practice evokes an inflammatory response. Also
concerned by the practice, Congress, the president, and agencies have
established various mechanisms for dealing with midnight
155. See id. at 2331–39 (describing agency accountability under the presidential-control
model).
156. Bressman, supra note 151, at 470.
157. See infra discussion accompanying notes 233–35. For a discussion of Fox and the
legitimacy of political motives for agency position changes, see infra Part III.C.2–3.
158. See Bressman, supra note 151, at 463 n.3 (collecting sources that critique the
presidential-control model as incomplete).
159. Indeed, the larger debate over the balance of power between outgoing and incoming
presidents already exists. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
98–101 (2006) (arguing that the time lapse between election day and inauguration day hurts
political accountability); Nina A. Mendelson, Quick off the Mark? In Favor of Empowering the
President-Elect, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 464, 464–66 (2009), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/19/LRColl2009n19Mendelson.pdf (suggesting that
more should be done to give an incoming president some political control during the transition).
160. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 5, at 625 (“Newspapers with national circulation, such
[as] the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington
Post reported on the details of [a Clinton midnight] rule and the Bush administration’s response
to it, the progress of lawsuits against the rule, and public reaction.”).
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161

regulations. In practice, however, the main responses to midnight
rulemaking have been executive suspensions of the effective dates of
162
163
midnight rules and judicial challenges to controversial regulations.
Although Congress also exercises limited control over midnight
164
rulemaking, this Section focuses on executive responses to the
phenomenon.
Cleaning up after midnight takes a new administration a lot of
165
time and effort. With respect to the incoming administration, “it has
become a tradition for the incoming Chief of Staff to issue a memo on
inauguration day halting the publication of any remaining regulatory
166
actions and pulling back recent regulations not yet effective.”

161. See generally Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 177–90 (giving a history and overview of
regulatory review systems as well as their relation to midnight regulatory review).
162. See Jack, supra note 43, at 1482 (“[A]n incoming administration’s withdrawal and
suspension of [midnight] rules has become a familiar, if not inevitable, post-election
phenomenon.”).
163. See, e.g., Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 589–94 (noting that President Clinton’s lateterm mining rules were “immediately” challenged in court); see also Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1015, 1039–43 (2001) (explaining that an incoming administration could handle the barrage
of lawsuits over its predecessor’s midnight rules by settling those cases).
164. For example, a midnight rule could be rescinded by Congress under the Congressional
Review Act of 1996 (CRA), 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2006), a “blunt tool . . . [that] has only been used
once” to overturn a midnight rule, Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Activity in the Bush
Administration at the Stroke of Midnight, ENGAGE, July 2009, at 27, 29. “From its enactment in
1996 through March 2008, agencies have submitted 731 major rules to Congress, and only one,
the Clinton ergonomics rule, has been repealed under the CRA.” Note, The Mysteries of the
Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2169 (2009). The Obama administration
did not use it to undo any midnight regulations left by the Bush administration. COPELAND,
supra note 20, at 1. For a more in-depth analysis of the CRA review mechanisms, see generally
Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 95 (1997).
Although not discussed here, there have been other suggestions for Congressional
oversight of midnight regulations, including Representative Nadler’s proposed Midnight Rule
Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong. (2009). But see Beermann, supra note 135, at 359–69 (critiquing the
Midnight Rule Act).
165. See Beermann, supra note 134, at 986 (“[R]eviewing late-term actions by the Clinton
administration occupied a great deal of agency officials’ time and energy in the early days of the
administration.”).
166. Dudley, supra note 164, at 29. But see B.J. Sanford, Note, Midnight Regulations,
Judicial Review, and the Formal Limits of Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 784
(2003) (arguing that these suspension memoranda are illegal and should be struck down by the
courts). There have been other suggestions for executive control. See, e.g., Brito & de Rugy,
supra note 1, at 191–96 (proposing a limit on the number of rules that can be reviewed by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within a prescribed period before a transition).
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Since Reagan, every president taking over from a president of the
opposing political party has ordered a similar regulatory
moratorium. For example, two days after taking office, President
Clinton issued a directive to all agencies ordering them to
“withdraw . . . all regulations that have not yet been published in the
Federal Register.” George W. Bush issued a similar directive the
day he took office, ordering agencies to halt rules from being
published in the Federal Register and “temporarily postpone the
effective date of the [published] regulations for 60 days.” President
Barack Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel also issued a memo
167
withdrawing rules not yet published in the Federal Register.

Executive memoranda issued by both incoming and outgoing
administrations have become the predominant strategies for
168
counteracting midnight regulation. Although limited to the most
169
last-minute of unfinished midnight rules, these memoranda have
effectively enabled incoming presidents to change course quickly
170
from their predecessors.
Moreover, these suspension and
withdrawal memoranda are frequently suggested to new presidents as
171
one of the most effective means for handling midnight regulations.
Although these suspensions do not stand to end midnight rulemaking,
their enduring use after future presidential transitions seems
172
inevitable.

167. Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 189 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see
also Beermann, supra note 135, at 360 (“[O]n his first day in office President Obama directed
his administration not to issue any new rules until his appointees had a chance to review them,
to withdraw from publication any proposed or final rules that had been sent to the Federal
Register but not yet published, and to consider extending the effective date of published rules
that had not yet gone into effect . . . .”).
168. See Beermann, supra note 135, at 360 (“Presidents may already have sufficient tools to
deal with midnight regulation, as demonstrated by action taken by the administrations of
Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama to combat the
midnight regulatory activity of their respective predecessors.”).
169. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34747, MIDNIGHT
RULEMAKING: CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND A NEW ADMINISTRATION 7 (2008)
(“[F]or rules that have already been published in the Federal Register, the only way for the
departments or agencies to eliminate or change the rules is by going back through the
rulemaking process.”).
170. See supra note 168.
171. E.g., COPELAND, supra note 169, at 7–9 (suggesting such memoranda and giving a
history of their use); RUSHING ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (suggesting using memoranda that
“suspend effective dates” of unfinished midnight rules).
172. See COPELAND, supra note 20, at 3 (“The [Obama administration’s] Emanuel and
Orszag memoranda were only the latest in a long history of incoming presidential
administrations imposing a moratorium on new regulations . . . .”).
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C. Judicial Review of Postinauguration Changes to an Outgoing
Administration’s Midnight Regulations
Presidents may take office faced with litigation arising from their
predecessors’ midnight regulations. For instance, courts handed the
Bush administration several prominent setbacks in its attempts to
undo the Clinton administration’s last regulations, including the
Department of Energy’s energy-efficiency standards for air
173
conditioners and a National Park Service rule banning snowmobiles
174
in Yellowstone. Similarly, President Bush’s midnight hours-ofservice rule for truckers has faced legal opposition from the early
175
days of the Obama administration.
Incoming administrations have faced the difficulty of explaining
why a rule promulgated by the previous administration—albeit
176
hurriedly—is no longer valid and should be modified or rescinded.
177
Although the reasons for these reconsiderations may be political,
the government has had trouble defending its responses to midnight
rules on this ground because of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
178
Insurance Co. That case set a high bar for an agency’s justification

173. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Energy Conservation Standards
for Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps, 66 Fed. Reg. 7170 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 10
C.F.R. pt. 430); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 202–03 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that the rule was final and could not be reopened for comment).
174. Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System, 66 Fed. Reg. 7260 (Jan. 22,
2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105–
08 (D.D.C. 2003) (invalidating the Bush administration’s modification of the Clinton
administration’s rule).
175. Hours of Service of Drivers, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,567 (Nov. 19, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R.
pts. 385, 395); see also Petition for Review at 1, Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety
Admin., No. 09-1094 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 09, 2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
PetitionforReview1.pdf (challenging the driver-service-hour rule). Currently, the case is in
abeyance, as the Obama administration settled to start a new rulemaking. Joint Motion of
Petitioners and Respondent to Hold Case in Abeyance Pending the Issuance of a New Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking at 2, Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., No. 09-1094
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2009).
176. See, e.g., David H. Becker, Changing Direction in Administrative Agency Rulemaking:
“Reasoned Analysis,” The Roadless Rule Repeal, and the 2006 National Park Service
Management Policies, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 65, 70 n.21 (2006) (“[The]
explanations for withdrawing a proposed regulation, a ‘change in agency priorities,’ was . . . ‘not
informative in the least; it is merely a reiteration of the decision to withdraw the proposed
rule . . . .’” (quoting United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir.
2004))); see also infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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for a rule rescission, requiring a more extensive rationale than for
179
regulating in the first place. As Professor Beermann put it, “The
Supreme Court’s application of the arbitrary and capricious standard
to rescission and revision of rules has created some of the difficulties
that incoming administrations encounter when trying to undo
180
midnight rules.”
Authoritative judicial pronouncements are conspicuously absent
181
on the scope of regulatory power surrounding the transition period.
For midnight regulations, at least, the lack of judicial precedent may
be traceable to the fact that a new administration may moot a
controversy by rescinding the midnight regulation, thus precluding
182
further judicial review. Primarily, this Section explains the issues of
judicial review of midnight-rule procedure and examines the Supreme
Court’s recent FCC v. Fox decision, which may signal a lessening of

179. See id. at 42 (“[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency
does not act in the first instance.”); Marianne Koral Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule
Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1928, 1934 (1984) (“The . . . statement in the State Farm opinion
that may be a source of trouble stems from language to the effect that there is an implicit
congressional endorsement of the regulatory status quo. Pursuant to this rationale, the only
legitimate basis for rule rescissions would be a change in circumstances, not a change in
policy . . . .”); Jack, supra note 43, at 1502 (“[T]he [State Farm] Court established a presumption
in favor of the validity of a prior rule and ‘against changes in current policy that are not justified
by the rulemaking record.’” (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42)); see also Loring & Roth, supra
note 9, at 1441–42 (“As a result of State Farm, it is possible that an incoming anti-regulatory
administration faces more obstacles in repealing or amending midnight regulations that affect
public health and safety than a pro-regulatory administration.”).
180. Beermann, supra note 135, at 361.
181. See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 131, at 1270 (“There are no cases addressing
presidential duties and obligations with respect to transition . . . .”).
182. See O’Connell, supra note 23, at 905 (“If a midnight regulation is rescinded or
modified, any challenge to the original regulation’s timing is mooted.”); see also Beermann &
Marshall, supra note 131, at 1270 n.72 (explaining that any issue of the president’s power in the
transition period will likely escape review because the “transition period is so short that the
issue might be moot by the time it is ready for legal resolution”). But cf. Christopher N. May,
Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 865, 992–96 (1994) (arguing that when a President refuses to execute a law as
unconstitutional, he should ensure that the question is subjected to judicial review).
This Note does not discuss whether rule changes might evade mootness under the
voluntary cessation doctrine. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 189–90 (“[A]n
action . . . does not become moot merely because the conduct immediately complained of has
terminated, if there is a sufficient possibility of a recurrence that would be barred by a proper
decree.”). Rather, this Note assumes, as do the scholars cited above, that the posttransition
regulatory process does not count as a voluntary cessation that would preclude mootness.
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State Farm’s impediments to incoming presidents who want to undo
183
midnight rules.
1. Legal Background: Administrative Procedure, State Farm, and
Midnight Regulations. Agency rulemaking procedure is dictated
184
largely by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Today, most
rulemaking proceeds under the APA’s provisions for informal
185
rulemaking—also known as notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Under notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency must publish a
notice of intent in the Federal Register regarding the proposed rule,
solicit public comments for a specified period, and, if it decides to
issue the final rule, provide a “concise general statement of [its] basis
and purpose” that addresses all material comments no fewer than
186
thirty days before the rule’s effective date. A rule takes over three
years on average to promulgate under notice-and-comment
187
rulemaking procedures. Thus, the APA leaves little time for an
188
outgoing administration’s last-minute rulemaking. As agencies rush
to issue final regulations before the president leaves office, these rules
189
run a high risk of procedural deficiency. Many midnight rules have

183. For an overview of judicial review of administrative procedure in the midnight
regulation context, see O’Connell, supra note 23, at 905–08.
184. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006); see also Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 545–49 (1978) (holding
that courts cannot require agencies to follow rulemaking procedures beyond those that the
APA or another statute requires).
185. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also O’Connell, supra note 23, at 901 (“[T]he magic words ‘on the
record after opportunity for [a] . . . hearing’ were typically sufficient to require agencies to
undertake formal rulemaking procedures. . . . Because so few statutes contain the phrase,
agencies generally do not conduct formal rulemakings when promulgating legally binding
regulations.” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410
U.S. 224, 236–38 (1973))).
186. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d). Though Section 553 mentions a “concise” statement, modern
administrative law doctrine prompts agencies to produce extensive records, explanations, and
responses to comments. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont
Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 899 (2007) (explaining that to avoid procedural
deficiency, agencies “overproceduralize rulemaking by issuing . . . highly detailed proposed rules
with voluminous supporting material, and by conducting additional comment periods whenever
a significant change is warranted by the comments”).
187. STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 566 (6th ed. 2006).
188. Cf. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I), 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 (D. Wyo. 2003),
vacated as moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005) (observing that an agency had to follow “a very
short timeframe” to promulgate a rule before President Clinton left office).
189. See Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 558 & nn.33–34 (suggesting that procedural
“sloppiness” is characteristic of midnight rulemaking).
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been struck down by courts for failing to meet either the APA or
another statute’s procedural requirements because they are rushed
190
through the prescribed process.
Courts reviewing an agency’s rule promulgated under noticeand-comment rulemaking apply the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious”
191
standard of judicial review. For rule rescissions, the State Farm
Court interpreted the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to mean that
“an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be
192
required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”
[T]he revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different
than a failure to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the
agency’s former views as to the proper course. A “settled course of
behavior embodies the agency’s informed judgment that, by
pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by
Congress. There is . . . a presumption that those policies will be
193
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.”

Thus, the Court “reject[ed] outright the government’s contention that
rule rescissions should be narrowly reviewed and in essence treated
194
like agency decisions not to act.”

190. E.g., Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (stating that a rule’s promulgation was “driven
by political haste,” “violated the [procedural requirements of the] National Environmental
Policy Act and the Wilderness Act,” and was therefore arbitrary and capricious under the
APA); see also COPELAND, supra note 20, at 7–24 (describing twenty-five Bush administration
midnight rules whose procedural validity has been challenged successfully).
191. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
192. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
Over time, courts have broadened the scope of this holding beyond rule rescissions to cover all
sorts of agency position changes. See Becker, supra note 176, at 66 & nn.3–6 (explaining the
expanded scope of the State Farm doctrine and collecting cases). Observers have seen this
development as part of a body of administrative law that demands agencies act consistently and
with reason. See id. at 66 n.1 (explaining that the reason-and-consistency requirement is a
“settled principle of administrative law” and providing its background).
193. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41–42 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita
Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1973)).
194. Smythe, supra note 179, at 1933–34; see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (“An agency’s
view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in
circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis . . . [which]
the agency has failed to supply . . . .” (footnote omitted in original) (quoting Greater Bos.
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Beermann, supra note 134, at 984 (“[T]he Court took the regulatory status quo as the baseline
and reviewed whether the new administration had articulated a sufficient justification for
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Also at issue in State Farm were the seemingly political motives
195
for the underlying rule rescission. The contested rule, which
required that new automobiles be sold with passive restraints like
airbags, had been promulgated under President Carter but was
196
promptly rescinded once President Reagan took office.
The
government argued, in part, that this political change supported the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA)
decision to reevaluate the regulatory record and rescind the passive
197
restraint rule. The majority implicitly rejected the government’s
argument, holding instead that the reasons the government gave for
198
the rescission were inadequate. The majority viewed the political
explanation as tantamount to ignoring the rule’s supporting evidence
199
and thus held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious.
Justice Rehnquist, however, agreed with the government’s
reasoning: “A change in administration brought about by the people
casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
200
agency’s reappraisal of . . . its programs and regulations.” Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the agency should give a “rational
explanation” for rescinding the rule, but believed that the political
factors at play sufficiently explained the rescission of the passive
restraint rule such that NHTSA’s decision was not arbitrary or
201
capricious.

making a change.”).
195. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new
President of a different political party.”); see also Kagan, supra note 154, at 2382 (“President
Reagan took office with a clear (de)regulatory philosophy.”).
196. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 35–40 (providing the passive-restraint rule’s history).
197. See Smythe, supra note 179, at 1933–34 (“The decision to rescind was thus a political
decision, made because the new administration had pronounced policy differences from the old.
The decision to rescind also represented . . . a policy reversal. [Thus,] the government[]
conten[ded] that rule rescissions should be narrowly reviewed and . . . treated like agency
decisions not to act.”).
198. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55–57.
199. See id. at 56 (“[T]he agency has failed to offer the rational connection between facts
and judgment required to pass muster under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.”); see also
Smythe, supra note 179, at 1934–35 (arguing that the State Farm majority viewed the political
reasons for the rescission as not “justified by the rulemaking record” but not inherently
unacceptable (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42)).
200. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(footnote omitted).
201. Id. at 58.
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Although the Supreme Court did not directly address midnight
regulation in State Farm, the case has long been viewed as an obstacle
for incoming presidents wishing to undo the midnight regulations left
by their predecessors. First, State Farm could be interpreted as
requiring an agency to provide a more extensive rationale to justify
rescinding a rule than was required to support the decision to regulate
202
initially. Under this standard, the outgoing administration would
enjoy the ability to regulate at midnight based on a less extensive
203
justification than its successor would need to rescind the rule.
State Farm also foreclosed an important explanation underlying a
204
new president’s desire to undo midnight regulations—politics. In
State Farm, politics were an important reason behind the NHTSA’s
decision to rescind the passive-restraints rule. President Reagan had
successfully campaigned for office on a deregulatory platform and
205
saw the passive-restraint rule as a Carter-administration vestige.
206
Other presidential transitions have followed a similar pattern. Yet
State Farm deemed a political explanation for rescinding a rule left by
an outgoing president an insufficient justification. Although Justice
Rehnquist believed that a new president should have the power to
reconsider his predecessor’s rules by virtue of having been elected to
207
office, this view failed to garner majority support. Because the
Court appeared to mandate a heightened standard for rule
rescissions, State Farm became the leading case on what was required
202. See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 179, at 1934 (“[State Farm] can be viewed as requiring
agencies seeking to rescind regulations to meet a more stringent evidentiary burden than would
be required if the agency were promulgating a rule in the first instance.”); see also Becker, supra
note 176, at 80–83 (surveying federal appellate cases that invalidated rule changes under this
heightened burden).
203. See Beermann, supra note 134, at 984 (“[P]rior administrative action can tie a new
President’s hands more than if the President had to worry only about whether administrative
action complies with applicable statutes.”).
204. See Kagan, supra note 154, at 2380 (arguing that the State Farm Court “implicitly
rejected” a justification for agency position changes “centered on the political leadership and
accountability provided by the President”); see also Mendelson, supra note 5, at 601–02
(explaining that a new president will take office wanting to change midnight rules that conflict
with his “policy agenda”).
205. Kagan, supra note 154, at 2382.
206. For example, President Bush tried undoing the Clinton administration’s last rules.
Beerman & Marshall, supra note 131, at 1267 n.64. President Obama attempted the same for the
Bush administration’s midnight rules. See COPELAND, supra note 20, at 3–24 (cataloguing the
Obama administration’s efforts to undo the Bush administration’s midnight regulations); Cindy
Skrzycki, Obama Team Tracks Bush’s ‘Midnight’ Rules Rush, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2008,
00:00 EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aq8Q2ZkT1fsw (same).
207. See supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
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to support any agency rule change, including those made to midnight
208
rules after a new administration had taken office.
2. Reevaluating State Farm in FCC v. Fox. In 2009, the Supreme
Court decided FCC v. Fox, a case that dealt with expletives aired on
209
national television during high-viewership periods. At issue was the
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) fleeting expletive
standard, a policy that had been in place for decades but was
eliminated in response to pressure from the Bush administration and
210
its supporters in Congress. Several broadcasters, fined heavily by
the FCC for airing the expletives, argued that the FCC lacked an
adequate basis for departing from its earlier standard and asked the
Supreme Court to hold that the FCC’s new policy was arbitrary and
211
capricious. The petitioners based their argument on State Farm,
stressing that the Court in that case required a reasoned analysis for
rescinding a rule promulgated under a previous administration and
that the FCC had not done so for its policy change in the case at
212
hand.
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the FCC’s
departure from the established fleeting expletive policy was
213
procedurally adequate. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
interpreted the State Farm standard narrowly:
[There is] no basis . . . for a requirement that all agency change be

208. See Becker, supra note 176, at 73 (“Although State Farm is the leading case on agency
change of direction in rulemaking, the Court has analyzed regulatory revisions in several other
cases without conclusively stating how persuasive an agency’s explanation of a change of course
must be to survive judicial review.”).
209. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1809–10 (2009). Although not a
midnight rulemaking case, the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the State Farm
arbitrary-and-capricious standard, id. at 1810–11, may signal a shift regarding what counts as a
valid justification for changed agency positions.
210. Id. at 1810; see also id. at 1815–16 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he precise policy change at
issue here was spurred by significant political pressure from Congress.”). Since 1975, the FCC’s
policy had been that nonrepeated, or fleeting, expletives did not violate federal law banning the
broadcast of indecent language. But in 2004, the FCC changed its policy so that even a single
aired expletive could be actionably indecent. Id. at 1805, 1807 (majority opinion). For a
discussion of how the FCC’s decision was the culmination of the Bush administration’s efforts to
change aired indecency policy, see Albert W. Vanderlaan, Note, Sending a Message to the Other
Branches: Why the Second and Third Circuits Properly Used the APA to Rule on Fleeting
Expletives and How the New FCC Can Undo the Damage, 34 VT. L. REV. 447, 459–63 (2009).
211. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807–08.
212. Id. at 1810.
213. Id. at 1819.
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subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such
heightened standard. . . . [State Farm] . . . said only that such action
requires “a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may
214
be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”

Most importantly, the Court stressed that there is no difference in the
scope of review “between initial agency action and subsequent agency
215
action undoing or revising that action.”
Under the Court’s
reasoning, the burden on agencies to support a policy change is low,
as an agency need only “display awareness that it is changing
position” and “show that there are good reasons for the new
216
policy.” The agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the
217
old one.” Holding that “the Commission forthrightly acknowledged
that its recent actions have broken new ground,” the Court
determined that the FCC’s actions satisfied the threshold
218
consciousness-of-change inquiry. The FCC also satisfied the second
“good reason” prong because “[i]t is surely rational . . . to believe that
a safe harbor for single words would likely lead to more widespread
219
use of the offensive language.” Thus, the Court held that the FCC’s
policy satisfied its reinterpreted State Farm arbitrary-and-capricious
220
standard.
3. Implications for Midnight Rules. Before Fox, scholars agreed
that, under State Farm, an incoming president could not justify
rescinding his predecessor’s midnight rules by citing differences in
221
their respective policy platforms. Indeed, the notion that State Farm
could burden a new president wishing to ratchet back the midnight
regulations of his predecessor supported some of the earliest post–
222
State Farm commentary.
Commentators also noted that, if
214. Id. at 1810 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (emphasis added in original)).
215. Id. at 1811.
216. Id.
217. Id. Moreover, “the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than
what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.” Id.
218. Id. at 1812.
219. Id. at 1812–13.
220. Id. at 1813–14.
221. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 5, at 593 (arguing that State Farm would significantly
burden a new administration wishing to reverse policy from its predecessor, requiring “much
more” in the record to justify policy changes after a transition).
222. See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 179, at 1934 (“[State Farm] suggests that the regulatory
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challenged in court, a rule modified or rescinded after a presidential
transition would have to be backed by evidence supporting the
223
224
change. Lower court precedent on the issue was mixed, and
scholars disagreed over exactly how much of a justification would
suffice for a posttransition modification or rescission to survive
225
arbitrary-and-capricious review. Still, State Farm stood in opposition
to the political realities of modern presidential transitions—at least as
226
far as midnight regulations were concerned.
These difficulties brought calls for reform. Because of State
Farm’s obstacles, commentators suggested reducing the scrutiny for
repealing or modifying the midnight regulations of an outgoing
227
administration. These critics argued that the Supreme Court in State
228
Farm misperceived presidential policy’s role in midnight regulation.
Professor Beermann, for example, posited that “[t]he problem of
‘midnight regulations’ would be ameliorated if the standards for
judicial review took greater account of pure political-type policy
229
considerations.”

status quo that includes the unrescinded regulation is presumptively in accord with
congressional policy, making changes in that status quo presumptively ultra vires . . . .”).
223. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 176, at 70, 97 (commenting on the necessity of an agency
providing an explanation for its decision).
224. See id. at 97 (summarizing the mixed bag of lower court holdings applying the State
Farm standard).
225. Compare Loring & Roth, supra note 9, at 1441–42 (describing the State Farm standard
as a steep evidentiary barrier), with Becker, supra note 176, at 98 (“State Farm’s ‘reasoned
analysis’ standard places an apparently light burden on an agency to explain a change of
course.”).
226. See Beermann, supra note 135, at 361 (describing State Farm’s “difficulties” with
respect to rescinding midnight regulations); Loring & Roth, supra note 9, at 1441–42 (arguing
that State Farm prevents incoming presidents from acting upon midnight regulations); see also
Kagan, supra note 154, at 2380–83 (arguing that State Farm’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard
does not account for presidential political control of the regulatory process).
227. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 135, at 362 (suggesting reevaluation of State Farm
arbitrary-and-capricious review in the midnight rulemaking context to allow incoming
administrations to reverse the previous administration’s late-term regulations); Loring & Roth,
supra note 9, at 1460 (“[The Court should] either lower or eliminate the State Farm standard as
it is applied to midnight regulations. This would make it easier for the incoming administration
to repeal and amend an outgoing administration's midnight regulations, providing valuable
oversight while avoiding the pitfall of bias.”).
228. See Beermann, supra note 134, at 1011 (“[S]tandards of judicial review . . . [should] take
better account of the role that policy plays in the administrative process. Perhaps the [State
Farm] Court was wrong in its choice of the prior regulatory regime as the baseline for evaluating
new rules.”).
229. Id. at 1014. See generally Mendelson, supra note 5 (arguing that courts should
acknowledge political motives).
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Fox may have achieved this goal: even though Fox did not
directly confront midnight regulation, its endorsement of a seemingly
political motive for an agency reversing its position lends support to
presidents wishing to undo midnight regulations. Whereas
commentators thought State Farm meant that incoming presidents
230
could not easily modify or rescind midnight regulations, the Fox
Court implicitly repudiated the language in State Farm that had been
read to require a heightened standard of review of an administration’s
231
reasons for rescission or modification. In fact, the Court insisted
that agencies would not have to explain why a new, modified, or
232
rescinded rule was better than its predecessor. Although its full
effect has not yet been realized, Fox apparently enables new
presidents to undo midnight regulations left by their predecessors.
For midnight regulations, this development may have broader
implications for how courts view an incoming administration’s rule
changes. First, courts will probably not scrutinize an incoming
administration’s motives for changing an outgoing administration’s
regulations that conflict with the new president’s policies. Second, the
Court has signaled that posttransition regulatory change is not meant
to be difficult to justify. More broadly, these considerations speak to
the legitimacy of law change, even when politics are responsible for
233
an agency’s change in position. By recognizing the legitimacy of
political motives, Fox thus reflects a presidential-control viewpoint of
234
the administrative state. As an exercise of presidential control,
midnight rulemaking seems legitimate under Fox—as is undoing
235
midnight rulemaking. These concerns dovetail with the motive
inquiry courts make when deciding a vacatur-for-mootness question,
and the following Part illustrates why a vacatur question should be
answered affirmatively for changes to midnight regulations.

230. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 213–17.
232. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009).
233. See id. (“It suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.”).
234. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.C.2.
235. For a discussion of incoming presidents’ motives for changing unfinished midnight
rules, see supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
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IV. EVALUATING THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO VACATUR
AND MIDNIGHT REGULATIONS
The Tenth Circuit’s vacatur analysis was correct, and courts
should follow its approach in future cases when a contested midnight
regulation is modified or rescinded pending appeal. Although the
236
question is open under current Supreme Court precedent, vacatur is
the appropriate remedy when a new administration’s rule moots a
controversy over the outgoing administration’s midnight regulations.
This discussion also illuminates the broader issues of midnight
rulemaking and rule-change mootness.
A. Analysis under Current Doctrine
Most importantly, a midnight rule’s posttransition rescission can
be squared with existing Supreme Court precedent supporting
vacatur. Such rescissions or modifications fit Munsingwear’s
happenstance notion because the underlying reason for the rule
change—a presidential power shift—is not attributable to the partyagency even when that agency’s actions voluntarily mooted the
237
case. Rather, agencies under new administrations change these
unfinished rules midappeal, for example, because of policy
differences or because they believe the midnight rules left for them
238
are politically untenable. Midnight-regulation rescissions are readily
distinguishable from situations like Cammermeyer because incoming
administrations do not rescind midnight rules in response to the
outcome of litigation, but rather because of the new administration’s
239
beliefs about the rules themselves. These particular rule changes are
further distinguishable from cases like Tafas because, although the
government is responsible for mooting the case by changing the
disputed rule, the new administration is more akin to a new litigant,
240
dissatisfied with the rule left by its predecessor.
236. E.g., Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194–95
(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that Supreme Court precedent has not established a categorical rule); see
also supra Part II.B.
237. Cf. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(noting that after a rule change moots a case, “the executive branch is in a position akin to a
party who finds its case mooted on appeal by ‘happenstance,’ rather than events within its
control”).
238. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
239. Cf. Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying vacatur because
the government rescinded its rule after losing in court).
240. For a discussion of Tafas, see supra text accompanying notes 120–26.
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These rule changes also dovetail with Bonner Mall because,
although a new administration’s rescission of a midnight rule might
count as a voluntary action, the incoming administration does not
241
rescind a rule as an alternative to pursuing an appeal. A trickier
question might arise when the president comes to power and settles
with the litigants on the condition that the administration will begin a
242
new rulemaking process. Vacatur would still likely be proper in this
situation, however, if the settlement terms moot the case. Though the
new administration’s response to the midnight regulation is
technically a settlement and may thus appear to fall under Bonner
243
Mall’s antivacatur presumption, the settlement stems from a belief
by both parties that the underlying rule is defective or otherwise
244
undesirable. That is, vacatur would be appropriate because the new
administration would not be pursuing settlement to avoid appellate
review.
Moreover, Fox might answer whether a rule rescission in such a
245
scenario should affect the vacatur outcome. Fundamentally, the
doubts over whether to vacate turn on questioning the government’s
246
motive for changing its rule.
After Fox, though, the new
administration needs only some justification for changing a rule, and
the Court seems to acknowledge that politics can supply that
247
reason. It is unclear how a court deciding a vacatur-for-mootness
issue could justify conducting a more searching review of a new
241. For a discussion of how recent incoming administrations have automatically suspended,
reversed, and revised an outgoing administration’s unfinished rules, see supra notes 166–67 and
accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Joint Motion, supra note 175, at 2 (describing the midlitigation settlement
between the Obama administration and plaintiffs contesting the Bush administration’s trucker
rules); see also RUSHING ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (explaining that settlements can “effectively
reverse” midnight rules); Rossi, supra note 163, at 1039–43 (discussing the implications of
settlement for midnight rules).
243. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994)
(“[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review.”).
244. See supra notes 144–47, 165–72 and accompanying text; see also Bonner Mall, 513 U.S.
at 29 (holding that although settlement generally bars vacatur, “[t]his is not to say that vacatur
can never be granted when mootness is produced in that fashion”).
245. See, e.g., Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194–
95 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Munsingwear and its implications
for a categorical rule); Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Bancorp presumption against vacatur might apply if the case has been
rendered moot on appeal by enactment or repeal of a regulation . . . .”).
246. See, e.g., Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005)
(analyzing the motive for repealing the roadless rule).
247. See supra Part III.C.2–3.
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248

administration’s decision to pull a disputed rule. Such an inquiry
would have fit well in the State Farm era, when political reasons for
rescinding rules posttransition were seen as insufficient to support a
249
250
rescission. But that standard has fallen by the wayside. That
posttransition rule changes are simply part of American political
251
practice favors vacatur. Although this argument does not address
whether vacatur is proper for all regulation changes resulting in
mootness, it explains why changes to midnight rules should avoid
scrutiny in the vacatur analysis.
Ultimately, confusion surrounding vacatur for mootness caused
by rule change stems from lower courts missing the rationale
underlying Supreme Court precedent. Bonner Mall’s focus on which
party mooted the dispute and subsequently requested vacatur has
misled the lower courts to focus similarly on the causal party in rulechange cases. For example, the Wyoming II court supported its
decision to vacate by noting that although the USDA had lost in the
district court and then changed its rule, interveners had appealed—
252
not the USDA. The Tafas court, however, denied vacatur because
253
the USPTO was the party responsible for mooting the dispute.
Courts can hardly be faulted for attempting to follow Bonner
Mall’s instruction, but Bonner Mall seems to miss the mark for
midnight-rule-change cases. One way to view posttransition rule
change is that even though the litigating parties might stay nominally
identical, when an incoming administration moots the dispute by
changing a rule, the party responsible for the mootness really has
changed. That is, incoming and outgoing administrations are different
254
entities under a presidential-control model of agencies.
Fox
supports this conceptualization, suggesting that presidential policy

248. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (holding that
there is no “requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review”); cf.
Khodara, 237 F.3d at 195 (refusing to question a legislature’s motive for rescinding a rule that
mooted the case).
249. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 135, at 361–66 (describing the “difficulties” that State
Farm created for rule rescissions following political transitions).
250. See supra notes 213–17 and accompanying text.
251. Jack, supra note 43, at 1482 (“[A]n incoming administration’s withdrawal and
suspension of . . . [midnight] rules has become a familiar, if not inevitable, post-election
phenomenon.”); see also Dudley, supra note 164, at 29 (“[M]idnight regulation is inevitable.”).
252. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005).
253. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
254. For a discussion of the presidential-control model, see supra notes 154–55 and
accompanying text.
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change can supply a nearly sufficient ground for agency position
255
change.
A better approach to these vacatur decisions, however, might
acknowledge that Bonner Mall represents a different category of case.
Bonner Mall led to focus on which party caused the mootness for fear
256
that losing parties would settle repeatedly to avoid bad precedent.
Though at least one court has expressed concern that agencies might
257
change rules in response to unfavorable lower court decisions, the
fear that agencies would routinely redeem from the Federal
Supplement judgments against midnight rules seems misplaced under
current doctrine. For example, civil litigants typically cannot assert
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. and agencies
258
can nonacquiesce in courts’ judgments. Agencies thus have less to
lose through bad precedent than litigants generally. Regardless of
what specific scenarios the Court has addressed in its vacatur
opinions, the ultimate question in the vacatur analysis is whether the
values served by vacatur outweigh those served by letting the
259
judgment stand. Bonner Mall simply protects a different set of
values than the ones at stake in litigation over an agency’s
regulations.
Indeed, vacatur for mootness caused by changes to midnight
rules reflects an entirely different public value of judgments than does
Bonner Mall: the public value of law change. Vacatur cases do not
explicitly recognize this value, but support for it appears in the
appellate decisions recognizing the appropriateness of vacatur when a
260
legislative change moots the case. Khodara Environmental, Inc. ex
261
rel. Eagle Environmental L.P. v. Beckman, for example, suggested

255. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (requiring only
that the agency be “aware[]” that it has changed position and give “good reasons” for doing so).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101.
257. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“[In] 19 Solid Waste Department Mechanics [v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.
1996),] . . . Albuquerque admitted that it had adopted the new policy in response to the district
court’s decision enjoining the existing policy as unconstitutional . . . .”).
258. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he decision to
vacate is not to be made mechanically, but should be based on equitable considerations.” (citing
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1994))).
260. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 351–54 (stating that vacatur should only
be granted when it serves the public interest and acknowledging the presumed legitimacy of law
change by legislative action).
261. Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl., L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001).
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the legislative change that had mooted the case was not manipulative,
but instead represented “responsible lawmaking” that “could . . . be
viewed as a commendable effort ‘to repair what may have been a
262
constitutionally defective statute.’” The National Black Police Ass’n
court similarly noted that “legislative actions are presumptively
legitimate” and refused to impute a vacatur-precluding manipulative
263
motive to the legislature responsible for the mootness in that case.
These concepts track the historical notion that the legislature is the
supreme source of lawmaking power and cannot be prevented from
264
changing the law. An analogous example of the reluctance to bind
the government is the bar on using nonmutual collateral estoppel
265
against the government. By allowing vacatur, courts have implicitly
accepted the legitimacy of legislative change—even though those
courts do so by analogizing the legislative action to happenstance so
266
as to fit within Munsingwear’s vacatur paradigm.
Regulatory changes should be treated similarly. The public
benefits from enabling agencies to change rules that those agencies no
longer believe are in the public interest and from according agencies
the same leeway as courts provide legislatures. The rub is that
agencies, unlike legislatures, find themselves parties to cases
invalidating rules. They are thus subject to Bonner Mall’s instruction
against vacatur when the voluntary action of a party causes
267
mootness. But courts presume the underlying action—a change in
262. Id. at 195 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
263. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 352.
264. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872–73 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(explaining the concept of legislative sovereignty and its English roots). But see id. at 873
(“[A]lthough we have recognized that ‘a general law . . . may be repealed, amended or
disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,’ and ‘is not binding upon any subsequent
legislature,’ on this side of the Atlantic the principle has always lived in some tension with the
constitutionally created potential for a legislature, under certain circumstances, to place
effective limits on its successors, or to authorize executive action resulting in such a limitation.”
(second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905))).
265. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 353 (suggesting that when legislative
action moots a case, “the executive branch is in a position akin to a party who finds its case
mooted on appeal by ‘happenstance,’ rather than events within its control”).
267. See, e.g., Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]t was the
USPTO (the losing party in the district court action) that acted unilaterally to render the case
moot, and vacatur is not appropriate.”); see also Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“'The principal condition to which we have looked is whether the party seeking
relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action.” (quoting U.S.
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994))).
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268

the law—legitimate. Fox lends further support to the legitimacy of
law change by agency action in suggesting that even a political
reevaluation of the existing legal standard is a valid ground for agency
269
position change. If this sort of agency change is legitimate, then rule
changes that cause mootness merit the same presumption given to
legislative changes. The focus of vacatur doctrine is equitable balance,
and courts have acknowledged that the interest in encouraging
legislative law change outweighs the value of preserving precedent.
Courts should apply Munsingwear and Bonner Mall less mechanically
and do the same for regulatory law change—regardless of whether a
party-agency mooted the dispute.
B. Broader Implications
Although midnight-rule-change mootness warrants vacatur
under current doctrine, several questions remain unanswered. First,
does the decision to vacate shed any light on the normative debate
surrounding midnight regulation? Second, are midnight rules special,
or does the propriety of vacatur for midnight-rule-change mootness
inform how courts should consider vacatur for all rule changes? This
Note does not answer these questions but introduces a framework for
thinking about them.
The first question implicates the ongoing dispute over whether
midnight rulemaking—and undoing midnight rulemaking—is a
270
legitimate exercise of presidential power. But questions concerning
the propriety of midnight rulemaking are not part of vacatur doctrine.
271
vacatur
Although courts are aware of midnight rulemaking,
272
doctrine directs courts to analyze the reason for mootness. An
incoming administration changes a rule because it thinks its
predecessor’s unfinished midnight rule is either procedurally invalid
273
or at odds with its own policies. For the vacatur inquiry, either
purpose suffices as a legitimate reason for changing rules.
Whether to vacate when a midnight-rule dispute has been
mooted is thus a question of what the incoming administration thinks

268. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 263.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 233–35.
270. For a brief introduction to this debate, see supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 173–80 and accompanying text.
272. See supra text accompanying note 92. For an overview of cases addressing the vacatur
for mootness doctrine, see supra Part II.B–C.
273. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
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about midnight regulation. If midnight rulemaking were truly in the
public’s best interest, a presumption against vacatur for mootness
caused by postinauguration changes might be appropriate. Courts
might discourage incoming administrations from changing unfinished
midnight rules by denying vacatur, but that approach would
274
For
contradict fifty years of vacatur-for-mootness doctrine.
example, courts routinely vacate when statutory changes moot
275
litigation. Moreover, whether midnight regulation is objectively
276
desirable is a State Farm–era question for courts to ask. Instead,
what matters in the vacatur-for-mootness analysis is whether the
incoming administration thinks midnight rulemaking is undesirable.
On a broader level, midnight rulemaking is an accepted part of
the contemporary political landscape. The public will likely expect the
incoming president to attempt to undo midnight rules left by the
outgoing administration. If unfinished rules conflict with the new
president’s policies, the attempt to change the rules is not an
improper purpose for the vacatur analysis. Whether midnight
regulation is normatively desirable is a question for political scientists,
not courts. Although observers often criticize midnight rulemaking as
an illegitimate exercise of presidential power, this question does not
matter in the vacatur-for-mootness analysis. Vacatur for mootness
only requires courts to ask why the case became moot, and for
postinauguration changes to midnight rules, that question has been
answered.
But the way courts analyze vacatur in midnight-rule-change cases
might inform how observers should view midnight rulemaking
generally. If a court acknowledges that an incoming president is
changing an unfinished midnight rule because it was defectively
promulgated, that court implicitly recognizes the rulemaking was not
a legitimate exercise of administrative authority. A defectively
promulgated rule is never legitimate. If, however, the court believes
that a postinauguration change is legitimate and warrants vacatur,
then the court implicitly acknowledges the rule change was a
legitimate exercise of executive power—at least to the extent that the
executive branch had no manipulative motive for changing the rule.

274. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s vacatur-for-mootness jurisprudence, see supra
Part II.A–B.
275. See, e.g., supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text.
276. For further discussion of the shift in the justification for agency position change from
State Farm scrutiny to Fox’s relaxed standard, see supra Part III.C.
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But if it is legitimate for an incoming administration to change a
midnight rule, it must also be legitimate for an outgoing
administration to promulgate that rule. Indeed, this view accords with
the model the Supreme Court seems to have adopted for evaluating
277
the procedural legitimacy of agency position changes. Viewed
through this lens, midnight rulemaking is a normal part of
presidential transitions rather than a sinister political practice.
The second question essentially asks why the vacatur calculus
should focus on midnight rulemaking specifically. Indeed, courts have
indicated the uncertainty in vacatur doctrine about rule-change
278
mootness generally. Changes to midnight rules that moot disputes
are an admittedly narrow subsection of these cases. Although this
Note’s insights are not necessarily limited to vacatur for midnight-rule
changes, there are several reasons to focus attention on them.
Overall, the main focus in the vacatur analysis is the cause of the
mootness. For rule changes, that inquiry turns on the legitimacy of
the rule change: was it in response to a belief that the rule was
279
inadequate or was it in response to unfavorable litigation? Surely
more rule changes than those in response to unfinished midnight rules
would fall into this first category. But midnight-rule changes have
additional attributes that make them even less likely to be perceived
as illegitimate. Midnight rules are characteristically rushed and
280
susceptible to procedural defect, and today’s incoming presidents
routinely change or at least suspend the midnight rules left by their
281
predecessors. Both factors make midnight-rule changes that cause
mootness more likely to warrant vacatur across the board.
But if recognizing and protecting the public value of law change
282
is vacatur’s core, differentiating midnight-rule changes from other
rule changes is less important. Under this theory, courts would afford
rule changes the same presumption of legitimacy as legislative
283
changes, and courts would allow vacatur even when a party agency

277. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
278. For discussion of the confusion among lower courts about the application of vacatur
doctrine to rule-change mootness, see supra Part II.C.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30; see also supra text accompanying note 92.
280. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
281. For a discussion of action taken by incoming presidents in response to unfinished
midnight regulations, see supra Part III.B.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 260–66.
283. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (“[L]egislative actions are presumptively legitimate . . . .”).
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changed its rule after an unfavorable ruling or agreed to issue a new
rule as part of a settlement. This approach has not yet found much
284
favor with courts, but this Note’s argument that rule changes serve a
broader public interest than these courts suppose might guide future
vacatur decisions.
CONCLUSION
Midnight rulemaking is an established attribute of modern
presidential transitions. Outgoing administrations may rush to issue
midnight rules largely for political reasons. The incoming
administration has similar political motives for wanting to undo these
midnight regulations. Indeed, every recent president has suspended
his predecessor’s midnight regulations that had not gone into effect
by inauguration day. Private litigants, though, are unlikely to wait for
inauguration to challenge midnight regulations in court. This scenario
raises the possibility of litigation being interrupted by a rule change
that moots the case midappeal—the situation in Wyoming II. Case
law on this question is ambiguous, however, and some precedent hints
that vacatur is an improper remedy when an agency’s voluntary rule
rescission or settlement moots the case pending appeal.
The Tenth Circuit reached the correct result, though. Not only
can mootness caused by changes to unfinished midnight rules be
squared with existing vacatur doctrine, but broader public values
support vacatur in ways that courts have yet to examine. Moreover,
courts’ approaches to vacatur for changed midnight rules illuminate
the broader discussion about the legitimacy of midnight rulemaking
within the administrative state. Although these insights extend
beyond midnight rulemaking, they at least favor reaching the same
conclusion as the Wyoming II court.

284. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the fact
that the defendant agency “rendered this case moot by conceding that Cammermeyer should be
reinstated and by replacing the challenged regulation” counseled against vacatur); 19 Solid
Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142, 1244 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying
vacatur because the defendant City of Albuquerque changed its rule in response to losing in the
district court).

